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The Refugee Act of 1980:
Its Past and Future
David A. Martin*

International law is rich with provisions governing a nation's treatment of
refugees within its borders; it says very little about obligations to refugees
on another country's soil. I In general, nations have been extremely resistant to international legal requirements regarding initial admission of refugees, no matter how severe the persecution they flee nor how shameful
the squalor of the camps where they initially find haven.
The United States' enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980,2 although
stopping well short of a fixed international commitment to admit refugees,
reflects precisely the opposite priorities. The major focus during the legislative process was on constructing a framework for deciding which refugees to bring to the United States from overseas, and how many. The lack
of a strict legal obligation to do so mattered little, for the Act establishes
a generous framework and probably assures each year a high level of
admissions of refugees screened and selected abroad. Scant attention Was
directed, however, to the other half of the issue, the problem of asylum:
how shall the United States treat people who reach the country's shores
on their own and then claim to be refugees, entitled to all the protections
international law provides, most particularly to protection against expulsion to their homelands? How will their bona fides be determined, fairly and
without undue delay? Within six weeks of enactment in March 1980,
events revealed starkly the inadequacy of the basic provisions for asylum
seekers, when thousands of Cubans began arriving in Florida. The press
and the general public conceived of these arrivals as "refugees." When the
new Refugee Act failed to supply clear guidance on their immigration
status or on programs available for their care, disillusionment with the Act
spread, 3 fed by the general confusion of the U.S. response to the influx.
* David A. Martin is assistant professor of law at the University of Virginia. From 1978
to 1980 he served as special assistant to the assistant secretary for human rights and
humanitarian affairs at the Department of State, where he was deeply involved in the
department's work on the Refugee Act of 1980. The author wishes to acknowledge the
thoughtful research assistance of Michael R. Calabrese.
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The shortcomings of the asylum provisions should not obscure the
legitimate accomplishments of the Refugee Act of 1980. On the matters it
addressed squarely-relating principally to U.S. programs to move selected
refugees from distant overseas camps and provide for effective resettlement in the United States-its sections reflect sound choices from among
difficult alternatives. Even with regard to asylum for direct arrivals, the Act
made some useful changes, although one might now wish that Congress
had used the Act as the occasion for a thorough review of asylum procedures and standards.
Offered here is a description of the key provisions of the Refugee Act,
suggesting why they took the shape they did and outlining the major
difficulties that remain in crafting and sustaining effective refugee and
asylum policies.

BACKGROUND
To understand why 1980 brought the United States a new refugee law, one
only need examine the refugee situation in the autumn of 1978, and the
statutory provisions then available to cope with it. Other times might serve
equally well, but it was then that the Carter Administration bowed to the
inevitable and began to draft its own detailed proposal for legislation, a
proposal ultimately sent to Capitol Hill in March 1979.
At the time, U.S. refugee programs formed a scattered and unruly, if
admirably humanitarian, collection. Indochinese refugees claimed most of
the headlines. In 1975 the United States had resettled 130,000 refugees
who escaped as Saigon was falling. Many in Congress and the Administration had thought that that action spelled the end of the United States'
Indochinese refugee problem. The events of late 1978 disabused them of
that view. Large commercial ships bearing thousands of fleeing Vietnamese
appeared in the South China Sea, seeking a nearby country that would
accept their human cargo. Overwhelmed with the refugees already in
camps, some nations stiffly resisted landings. Public outcry in the United
States grew. The Administration had authorized admission of 25,000 Indochinese refugees in June 1978. It became clear that autumn that a new
authorization would be needed before year's end. 4
At the same time, the Soviet Union, tacitly acceding to American and
world pressure, allowed a major increase in the number of Jews permitted
to emigrate. Their exit visas stated Israel as their destination, and the first
groups that had left, beginning in 1972, went to that nation in overwhelming proportions. By 1978, however, increasingly aware that the United
States would tolerate or even welcome such a practice, Soviet emigrants,
upon reaching Vienna, were breaking off in growing numbers from their
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Israel-bound colleagues and heading for the United States. Nearly twothirds of the 1978 emigrants opted for the United States, and the de facto
U.S. policy was to accept all who chose to come. 5
Cuba had long been the largest contributor of refugee populations to the
United States. Although the so-called freedom flights, which had brought
270,000 Cubans to U.S. shores since the flights' inception in 1965, had
ended in 1973,6 that experience was not forgotten. The drafters of the new
legislation knew that they must provide for those cases where the United
States might choose to accept refugees directly from their country of
origin. Even without the freedom flights, there remained a steady trickle
into the United States of Cuban refugees who applied for admission at U.S.
refugee program posts in Europe. And a change in Cuban policy in November 1978 would soon generate direct movements from Cuba once again:
Castro was suddenly willing to release 1,500 political prisoners and their
families. 7 A relative handful of refugees from other countries joined the
America-bound flow: Eastern Europeans, Iraqi Christians, Ethiopians,
Lebanese, Chilean and Argentine political prisoners, and others. In October 1978, overall refugee admissions were running at an annual level of
50,000, soon to rise. 8
These wide-ranging refugee admissions ostensibly transgressed the limits of the immigration laws. Congress had enacted only one specific provision for such admissions, section 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). 9 Passed in 1965 as part of a major revision of the
INA, 10 it permitted the "conditional entry" of only 17,400 refugees annually. 11 Moreover, the restrictions were not solely quantitative. Only those
fleeing either a Communist country or a country in the general area of the
Middle East qualified. When pressures built for admission of more than
this annual quota, or of refugees thoughtless enough to flee non-Communist regimes outside the Middle East, the executive branch had to resort
to creative use of a different provision, section 212(d)(5) of the INA,
granting the attorney general the power to parole aliens into the United
States. 12
The parole provision hardly reads like a refugee law, and indeed it has
always had many uses outside the refugee field. 13 It speaks of parole as
temporary permission to cross U.S. borders, granted in the discretion of the
attorney general. The 1978 refugees, however, were undeniably coming for
a permanent stay. Moreover, since events overseas generated admission
decisions, the president and the secretary of state, rather than the attorney
general, were usually the important decision makers.
A president first invoked the parole power for a large group of refugees
in 1956, in response to the Hungarian crisis. That decision enjoyed widespread congressional support, but an undercurrent of opposition to the use
of parole for large groups began to grow, until it seemed to triumph in
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1965. The committee reports accompanying the major immigration
amendments that year sternly reminded the executive branch that parole's
"original intention" was to ameliorate hardship in isolated individual
cases. The reports further pronounced an "express intent" that parole no
longer be used to admit refugees, since the new legislation made permanent provision for such persons in the section establishing conditional
entry. 14 Rarely have such pointed statements in legislative history had so
little effect. In the very speech that accompanied his signing of the 1965
amendments-a ceremony held at the base of the Statue of LibertyPresident Johnson announced the start of a massive new refugee parole
program, the Cuban freedom flights. 15
President Johnson's boldness did not carry over to his successors. Although they still used the parole power, on occasion, to :amit refugees,
they consulted routinely with the two Judiciary Committees before authorizing paroles. And often later administrations could not bring themselves to assert that such paroles were wholly legitimate, even though the
clear pattern of administrative practice, bolstered by congressional acquiescence and funding support (which had been consistently provided
despite some grumbling), would have furnished a respectable foundation
for such an argument. 16 Even the Nixon Administration, not notoriously
shy about exercising broadly discretionary executive powers, apologized
for its use of the parole power to admit refugees and promised that the
practice was only temporary. 17
The House Judiciary Subcommittee with jurisdiction over refugee matters provided the principal forum for executive branch hand-wringing.
Congressman Joshua Eilberg, who had succeeded to the chair in 1973,
regularly secured from administration witnesses admissions that refugee
paroles rested on a dubious foundation. 18 The litany of mutual doubts was
familiar, but the witnesses kept returning for more paroles, and just as
regularly they gained the acquiescence of Chairman Eilberg and his subcommittee.
Eilberg's counterpart on the Senate side, Senator Edward Kennedy, also
expressed dissatisfaction with the provisions governing refugee admissions, but for different reasons. He saw the conditional entry provision as
far too inflexible. He chafed at the cautious and stingy use of the parole
power by successive administrations, leaving the United States, he believed, with an inadequate, piecemeal response to refugee crises around the
world. 19
Provisions governing assistance to refugees presented an equally unruly
prospect. The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 20 opened a
broad range of federally funded domestic programs to refugees, if they
came from the Western Hemisphere 21-a formulation that clearly meant
Cubans. Cubans who arrived in 1978, as in prior years, benefited from the
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extensive public assistance, language and occupational training, and health
and education programs authorized in the legislation. By 1978, however,
another feature of the 1962 Act had engendered resentment against the
Cubans and against Florida, where most had settled. That Act contained
no provision for termination of the special 100 percent federal funding of
cash and medical assistance for Western Hemisphere refugees. Some Cubans were still benefiting from such federal largesse even though they had
been in the United States a decade or more and were otherwise completely
assimilated. Finally, in 1978 the Administration succeeded in negotiating
with a tenacious Florida congressional delegation a six-year phaseout of
the special funding. But no statute embodied that agreement; it took the
more tenuous form of a mention in an Appropriations Committee confer-

ence report. 22
The same 1962 Act authorized contributions to international refugee
organizations and also a program of assistance for other (Eastern Hemisphere) refugees, but only while they were overseas. 23 The fall of Saigon
in 1975, therefore, necessitated special legislation to assist in the care of the
refugees who came to the United States. The Indochina Migration and
Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 made the full range of programs authorized
for Cubans by the 1962 Act applicable to Vietnamese and Cambodian
nationals. 24 A year later, Congress had to catch up with reality by extending those same provisions to Laotian refugees. 25 The 1975 Act had an
explicit termination date. Pressed by representatives from the states most
heavily burdened, however, Congress repeatedly extended the cutoff date,
each time altering the termination formula. 26 Termination was proving to
be nearly as vexing a problem as it had been with the Cubans.
In 1978 as well, the increased numbers of Soviet refugees were beginning to strain the resources of the voluntary agencies that had assisted
them in the past without special federal assistance after arrival. The Appropriations Committees stepped into the breach. They attached a rider to
the fiscal 1979 foreign assistance appropriations act, making twenty million dollars available through the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare for assistance to refugees not otherwise eligibile, primarily Jewish
refugees from the Soviet Union. 27
This motley collection of assistance programs afforded numerous occasions for disputes between the executive and legislative branches over
levels and types of assistance, and it fueled complaints that refugee programs discriminated unfairly among refugee groups. Use of the parole
power to admit refugees also remained controversial. Although large
paroles were essential, given what came to be seen as unrealistic ceilings
on conditional entry, parole consultations were almost guaranteed to be
unpleasant, particularly the sessions held with the House subcommittee.
As rapidly growing refugee flows forced a shortening of the intervals
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between parole consultations, interbranch friction flared. Predictably, the
need for supplemental budget requests mushroomed, and the congressional funding committees joined the chorus of dissatisfaction. 28 The two
branches found themselves increasingly at odds in trying to cope with
unpredictable refugee developments using the somewhat haphazard collection of statutory provisions.
These combined frustrations account for the surprisingly wide consensus that new legislation was needed. Outside lobbying played at most a
minor role; their own unhappy experience with the process furnished the
key executive and congressional figures with ample motivation for hammering out the Refugee Act of 1980 and seeing it through to enactment.

KEY PROVISIONS
The Refugee Act follows earlier practice in preserving two quite separate
schemes for extending protection and aid to people allowed to reside in the
United States because of the likelihood of persecution in their homelands.
The treatment of those who are screened and selected overseas and
brought to the United States by the U.S. Government is controlled by the
refugee provisions of the Act. Those who reach the United States on their
own, entering either illegally or on a nonimmigrant visa, and who then
claim protection against return, have their claims reviewed under the asylum provisions of the Act. Although the two categories overlap in some
important respects and are rarely kept distinct in the popular conception
of "refugees," lumping the two together only generates unnecessary confusion. The following discussion keeps them separate, treating the refugee
provisions first.
Refugees-Immigration Status
and Federal Assistance
One who enters the United States under government programs for movement of refugees from overseas is immediately given documentation
showing "refugee" status-a new immigration status created by the Refugee Act. 29 Like conditional entrants under the old procedures, refugees
must submit to reinspection by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) after an initial period before gaining entitlement to permanent resident alien status. The Act reduces the conditional period to one year,
however, and it reflects an expectation that virtually all refugees will
qualify for adjustment at that time. The grant of permanent resident status
is retroactive, so that refugees, in general, will qualify for citizenship five
years after arri val (four years after adjustment of their status). 30 Section
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212(a) of the INA31 contains a lengthy list of qualitative requirements that
aliens must meet to be admissible-addressing factors such as health,
literacy, ability to be self-supporting, or past membership in the Communist Party. The Refugee Act waives six of these requirements for all refugees, and authorizes the attorney general to waive most other
requirements when justified by individualized humanitarian considerations. 32 The Act solves the federal assistance riddle by making all refugees
in this country equally eligible, regardless of their origin, and by tying
termination to the individual's arrival date rather than to the beginning of
U.S. concern for a particular refugee group. Each refugee will qualify for
the most costly types of special federal funding for three years after arrival.
Thereafter, each is remanded, in most respects, to whatever forms of cash
and medical assistance the state makes available to its other residents. 33
These changes represent marked improvements over the system that
previously applied to conditional entrants and refugee parolees. They are
ancillary, however, to the Act's resolution of the major issues that have
troubled U.S. refugee policy since World War II: how many people will the
United States admit as refugees, and who will be chosen for admission
from among the millions of refugees in the world?
Refugees-How Many?
The Act establishes a base line of 50,000 refugees to be admitted annually.
Before the beginning of the fiscal year, however, the president can act to
raise that "normal flow" level, following congressional consultations, upon
a finding that such action is justified by humanitarian concern or the
national interest. 34 By October I of each year, therefore, a formal Presidential Determination will establish a fixed level of new admissions, usable
for budgeting and resettlement planning. But refugee flows will not always
obey September's projections, and the Act provides an outlet for new
crises. An "unforeseen emergency refugee situation" can form the basis for
new consultations with Congress at any time during the fiscal year, leading
to a new Presidential Determination fixing additional refugee admission
numbers. 35

Why did the Act not simply set a 50,000 base line and leave all possible
overflows to the emergency admission procedures? Such, in fact, was the
original Administration approach, approved by President Carter in April
of 1978 and conveyed at that time to the Judiciary Committees in summary
form. 36 The answer requires an understanding of the precise concerns

underlying the Act.
By 1978, Congress had grown especially restive with frequent paroles.
Particularly within the House Judiciary Subcommittee and the two Appropriations Committees, a suspicion developed that tenderhearted refugee
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program officials at the State Department were following a nickel-anddime approach to refugee admissions: seek the highest admissions the
market would bear, foreswear advance prognostications about future
flows, and come back to the Congress for another parole consultation and
more money when desparate overseas conditions created the climate for
another dime's worth of admissions. That perception was largely unfair.
The refugee problems of 1978 outpaced everyone's expectations. Nevertheless, the perception had its impact, and it rubbed off on some members
of the Administration team, particularly at the White House and the Justice Department. As a result, they and their congressional counterparts
sought assurance that no emergency admission provision would be as
open-ended as the parole power had been.
Congressman Eilberg had started the latest effort for a new refugee law
by introducing his own bill early in 1977.37 It set annual admissions at
20,000 and specified in detail the circumstances justifying new emergency
admissions, up to an additional 20,000 refugees. Senator Kennedy countered early in 1978 with his own-predictably more flexible-bill, setting
the baseline nonemergency figure at 40,000. 1 When the Administration
took its long awaited stand on the issue in April of 1978, it upped the ante
to 50,000, linking the number, shortsightedly, to its then-current plans for
1978 refugee admissions. 3 9 Fifty thousand would be a firm ceiling, subject
to breach only in true emergencies. Although the bill fixed no numerical
limit on emergency admissions, Administration spokesmen stressed that
the emergency provision could be invoked only as "the result of new,
0
unforeseen emergency conditions." 4
The April announcement proved the Administration's devotion to
avoiding the haphazard nickel-and-dime increments of the past. But problems were buried that would soon surface. What if the world were afflicted
with a massive new refugee exodus that stretched over several years? In
the first year, the United States could respond using the emergency power,
but thereafter could hardly claim that the problem was "unforeseen."
Total admissions would have to drop back to 50,000 the following October
1, in the midst of what might be a major resettlement effort. Some had
pressed this point in internal Administration debates before the April
announcement, but without success.
By February 1979, when the Administration was putting the finishing
touches on its proposed bill, events brought home to Administration players the concerns they had overlooked. Fifty thousand refugee admissions
seemed fine in April, but by February new paroles had taken the annual
admissions rate over 100,000. It would have been intolerable to make
100,000 a new statutory baseline. Those involved truly hoped that such a
rate was aberrational, although most were resigned to it as an aberration
that would continue for several years. It would be equally intolerable,
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though, to take a proposal to Congress that made 50,000 seem a reasonable
normal flow number, in the midst of annual admissions far above that
level. Could the emergency provision be stretched instead, perhaps removing unforeseeability as a requirement for invoking the emergency admission power? In light of the April assurances, such a move would have
brought congressional condemnation as a revival of the old unbridled
parole discretion.
Administration drafters hit upon a different approach, and the Congress
ultimately accepted it without major alteration. 41 Rather than abandon the
50,000, they simply altered its significance. This normal flow number could
be adjusted upward for foreseeable refugee needs, one time per year only,
through timely action taken by the president before October 1 following
consultation with Congress. Since the Act necessarily retained the emergency provisions-to deal with refugee problems that truly were not foreseen when the normal flow number was fixed-the resulting structure is
complex. Almost by accident, however, the evolution traced above produced a creature surprisingly well adapted to the climate in which it would
have to function.
Earlier refugee admission schemes foundered in criticism because all
were subject to sharply incompatible demands. Members of Congress and
the public have generally wanted refugee programs to be flexible, so as to
meet new crises effectively. But at the same time, they have wanted no
surprises-that is, they have demanded planning and control. Flexible
provisions, especially the parole authority, have drawn condemnation
since at least 1965 for seeming to place the executive branch's admission
decisions beyond control. When Congress sought to reimpose control, it
often did so through fixed statutory ceilings like the annual limit of 17,400
on conditional entry. But events soon outran the ceilings, and the imperative of flexibility reasserted itself.
The Refugee Act reconciles these needs by employing careful procedural requirements rather than fixed ceilings. The executive branch can exceed
the 50,000 guideline, but it must ensure that most breaches of the ceiling
are foretold by October 1, to give all the actors-Congress, executive
branch agencies, local governments, and voluntary resettlement agenciesthe best possible forecast for the coming year. The Act puts teeth in this
assurance by denying to the executive the power later to increase admissions, unless such increases stem from truly unforeseen emergency situations. 4 2 The Act also requires the executive, for the first time, to assemble
planning data previously compiled only haphazardly, and to deliver them
to Congress before beginning consultations on increased admission levels.
Such data must include details on refugee populations worldwide, responses by other nations, U.S. resettlement and admission plans, cost
estimates, and a judgment about foreign policy, economic, social, and
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demographic impact. 43 Flexibility is preserved but within a procedural
discipline that should go far in meeting the need for planning and control.
A measure of the strength of this scheme for setting admission levels
is the warm acceptance it received from the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, chartered by Congress to review in detail the
full sweep of U.S. immigration laws. The Commission has recommended
retention of the basic refugee admission structure which the Act creates. 44 But the Commission's deliberations reveal the major remaining
problem. How can the United States reconcile the Refugee Act's disciplined but open-ended process with growing pressures for fixed limits on
overall immigration? 45 Should refugee admissions beyond some baseline
figure force a reduction in other immigration, or can the United States
allow those admissions to remain outside annual ceilings? 46
The issue of numerical limitations surfaced during the consideration of
the Refugee Act. Senator Walter Huddleston pointedly raised the question
of overall limits in the Senate; Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner championed the cause in the House Judiciary Committee deliberations. That
committee came within one vote of adopting a Sensenbrenner proposal
that would have reduced quota immigration by one immigrant for every
two refugees admitted in excess of 50,000, with the reduction to take effect
in the succeeding fiscal year. 47
The ceiling issue admits of no easy solution. Sound national planning
in the midst of rapidly growing world population warrants reasonable
population targets established in advance, apart from the pressures and
exigencies that may be felt in the midst of a particular crisis. Advocates
of a generous refugee policy have a hard time disputing that proposition,
at least when it is considered in the abstract. Senator Huddleston continues
his efforts in Congress to establish an overall ceiling, and the steady growth
in his support indicates the appeal of such a ceiling. 48 Refugee advocates,
nonetheless, harbor the concern that such a ceiling, however wise in principle, would only provide a rallying point and a high-minded rationale for
those who seek tight restrictions on refugee admissions for nativistic or
selfish reasons. Can these views be reconciled? A test of the two sides'
strength is more likely than reconciliation, and any legislative proposals
resulting from the Select Commission's work may well provide the battleground.
Refugees-Which Ones?
Estimates place the number of refugees and displaced persons in the world
as high as fourteen million. 49 How should the United States choose which
of these will be favored with resettlement in this country?
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United Nations Definition of 'Refugee"
As a first step, the Act limits resettlement to those who meet the United
Nations definition of "refugee," derived from the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: a person outside his or her homeland, unable
or unwilling to return or otherwise claim its protection because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 50 This
definition forms the basis for a growing body of international law which,
in the view of the bill's proponents, deserved to be strengthened and built
upon. 51 There was little controversy over the definition's adoption. Indeed, because its use eliminated the geographic restrictions that marred the
conditional entry provisions, it was widely welcomed.
In some respects, however, this definition serves to narrow eligibility for
U.S. programs, because it excludes certain people who had been eligible
under earlier refugee legislation and, indeed, who are popularly thought
of as "refugees." The UN definition does not embrace those who flee
natural disasters, nor, in most cases, those displaced by military operations
or civil strife. 52 (People who stream away from a battlefront generally are
not fleeing persecution targeted at them, but rather are seeking personal
safety.) The theory behind this technical limitation on the refugee category
is apparently that the bombs will cease falling, the floods will recede, but
persecution is implacable. Obviously such a generalization has sharp limits, but, as an exceedingly general rule of thumb, the theory is useful. It
distinguishes those uprooted persons who are more likely to be able to pick
up the pieces of their lives again in the place where they originated, and
who therefore have less need of resettlement in a distant land. The drafters
of the Refugee Act sought ways to contain the claims on inevitably limited
U.S. resettlement opportunities, and this restriction provided one such
method.
Little thought was given during consideration of the Refugee Act, however, to the difficulty inherent in making the individualized and finegrained determination of likely persecution which the UN definition seems
to require. This submerged problem receives closer attention below in the
discussion of asylum determinations, also governed by the same UN definition.
In-Country 'Refugees"
A person may flee his or her home under a genuine threat of persecution,
but does not become a refugee under the United Nations definition until
departure from his or her national territory. The definition expressly requires that the individual be "outside the country of his nationality" 5 3 -a
limitation that reflects a classical reluctance of international law to concern
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itself with the treatment of individuals inside their own national borders.
Even though expanded international action to promote human rights has
substantially eroded that classical view, 5 4 the definition's distinction retains some utility, especially in classifying a problem as a refugee question
rather than a human rights matter and in fashioning national or international responses accordingly.
This aspect of the UN definition posed certain difficulties in the drafting
of the Refugee Act. Historically, some of the largest groups resettled as
refugees by the United States had moved directly from their home countries to U.S. soil, via the Cuban freedom flights or the Saigon evacuation.
Under the UN definition, however, these people were not "refugees" when
the United States decided to bring them here, for they had not crossed the
boundaries of their homelands.
The Administration's original response to this problem, conveyed to the
Congress in April of 1978, was to abide by the wooden limits of the UN
definition, but explicitly to preserve the parole power for use in direct
movements to the United States. 55 As Administration drafting progressed
through the winter of 1978-79, the irony of this position gained wider
recognition. The new refugee legislation was meant to create a new and
disciplined decision structure. To exclude from that structure certain
movements of people threatened with persecution, solely because of the
inflexibility in a definition, hardly made sense, particularly when such
people traditionally made up a dominant proportion of U.S. refugee programs. Mor6over, the drafters could not count on continued congressional
willingness to tolerate such broad scope for the parole power.
In its final draft legislation, the Administration responded by leaving the
UN definition intact, but removing all procedural provisions requiring that
applicants for U.S. refugee programs meet the definition at the time of
approval for ultimate resettlement in the United States. 56 Under this
framework, U.S. officials would still screen applicants in the home country
for compliance with the "well-founded fear of persecution" test and also
for satisfaction of any other criteria of U.S. programs, but applicants would
not formally have to satisfy all portions of the UN definition until they
reached the United States. By then, of course, they would be outside the
country of their nationality.
Unfortunately, after the draft legislation was introduced, the Administration did a weak job in explaining this new wrinkle to the Congress. Key
congressional figures saw the Administration approach as a gimmick and
never proclaimed themselves persuaded that the Administration's scheme
would work. As a result, Congress chose instead to confront the problem
head-on by expanding the statutory definition of "refugee" through addition of a Part B. 57 Part A remains essentially the classic UN definition. Part
B extends to persons within their own country who are persecuted or who
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have a well-founded fear of persecution. Congress retained a concern,
however, that such a change might flood U.S. consulates with applications
from people claiming imminent persecution by their own governments and
hoping to secure a spot on the next flight to the United States. 58 Part B,
therefore, was channeled narrowly. Persons within their own country and
facing persecution will meet the definition only "in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation [with the Congress]
may specify."
...
In practice, for Part B of the definition to take effect with respect to a
given country, the president must make special provision in the Presidential Determination that sets admission numbers and allocates those numbers among refugee groups. The first two Presidential Determinations
under the Act have included such a specification, but have limited it to
certain persons in Vietnam, Argentina, and Cuba. 59 This restricted use of
Part B has provoked criticism. Some critics feel that the United States
should be more aggressive in offering refugee admissions in order to secure
release of political prisoners, or to arrange for protection and removal of
persons ousted in a coup or threatened by one faction or another in a civil

war. 60
Each of those aims is worthy, but the president's cautious employment
of the definition's Part B is warranted. First, release of political prisoners
to exile is at best a mixed victory for U.S. policy. Human rights activism,
by both governments and nongovernmental organizations, may build
effective world pressure on a regime to release certain political prisoners.
If released in their own country-and there have been many such releases
in recent years-the former prisoners may remain a visible symbol and a
constant spur to continued human rights efforts within the country.
Shipped overseas, however, they may find themselves reduced to voices
crying from a distant wilderness, having lost access to their countrymen.
The United States should not be too quick to invite oppressive regimes to
rid themselves of those they regard as troublemakers by exiling them to
our shores.
Second, even in circumstances where release into exile of a certain
political prisoner makes sense, forcing that release into the refugee mold
may prove counterproductive. The United States cannot accept a person
as a refugee without officially finding that he or she is subject to persecution. The home government may be willing to accede to emigration but
quite unwilling to accept the formal label of persecutor in the process.
Third, when a country is riven by civil war or in the midst of a coup
d'6tat, as a practical matter there is little the United States can do to protect
people by brandishing Part B of the definition. The history of U.S. decisions to move potential persecution victims directly to the United States
testifies to these practical limits. Those movements have always required
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either a secure area from which to load the refugees, as in Saigon in 1975,
or explicit host government agreement, as in the Cuban freedom flights or
the release of Argentine political prisoners. In the midst of a coup or civil
war, presidential invocation of Part B of the definition would only expose
graphically the limits of U.S. action in such a troubled situation. Absent
a willingness to send in the Marines to establish a secure area, U.S. refugee
resettlement efforts generally will be confined to those individuals able to
escape their national borders. Conceivably the United States could shelter
some within the American embassy but could not hope to move them to
this country without the cooperation of forces effectively controlling the
surrounding area. 61 Indeed, attempted sheltering might only invite an
invasion of the embassy. 62
Clearly, Part B of the refugee definition was designed to be used. But
its addition to the statute has occasioned overly expansive hopes. It must
be employed selectively, with eyes open to its practical limits and to the
risks that hasty invocation will prove counterproductive.
Allocation
The UN refugee definition, as modified, establishes the universe of persons
eligible for immigration to the United States as refugees. But this remains
an enormous universe, running to many millions of people. Some additional method was needed to select those who would actually gain admission.
Which Model? One possible selection model plainly was not to be followed: the model represented by section 203(a)(7) of the INA, the conditional entry provision. Scorn for that system surfaced repeatedly during
the deliberations on refugee legislation, in both the executive and legislative branches. The restriction to persons fleeing Communist or Middle
Eastern countries drew widespread condemnation as ideological and geographic discrimination. The new theme would be equity, 63 but equity is
a trickier concept to honor sensibly than many of its proponents have
acknowledged.
At one point it appeared that reaction to the shortcomings of conditional
entry might swing the admission provisions to a second model at the
opposite extreme. The bill Congressman Eilberg introduced in 1977 ostensibly made all refugees anywhere equally eligible for U.S. resettlement,
subject only to the bill's overall ceiling of 20,000.64 Applicants would
simply apply at U.S. facilities overseas and convince a U.S. officer that they
satisfied the UN definition. Resettlement spaces would then go chronologically to qualifying applicants based on time of application, much as regular
quota immigration is regulated.
This feature of the Eilberg bill provoked alarm among officials working
on the Administration response. 65 A purely chronological system might
easily force a refugee in Southeast Asia, for example, who fled torture,
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escaped under harrowing conditions, and was only grudgingly granted first
asylum in a meager refugee camp, to wait for years while others ahead of
him or her in line, who perhaps had received several resettlement offers
and in any event could await U.S. resettlement in more comfortable conditions elsewhere in the world, were first admitted.
A chronological system would foreclose any claim of invidious discrimination, to be sure, and it would ensure equity in its purest abstraction by
removing any possibility of distinctions based on politics or nationality.
But these virtues would come at too high a cost, for the system would also
preclude distinctions that ought to be made. Not all refugee situations are
created equal. Some groups face greater perils than others. Some find
immediate asylum in a willing and hospitable neighboring country without drastic cultural differences. Some enjoy a wider range of resettlement
options or may have greater hope of eventual repatriation. And some,
because of language, culture, or historical ties, for example, may be better
positioned to resettle successfully in the United States, while others, for
the same reasons, might have brighter prospects in other resettlement
countries. Such distinctions are relevant. To ignore them in the name of
equity is to render that concept hollow and mechanical.
In its April 1978 statement of position on refugee legislation, the Administration, therefore, took explicit aim at such a nonselective system.
The Administration emphasized that any acceptable bill must allow for
priority allocation of admissions to groups or classes of refugees "of special
concern to the United States." 66 Under the Administration proposal, allocations to such groups would be made periodically by the executive
branch, and could be changed easily in response to changing conditions.
Congress would be informed of allocations, but would play no formal role.
Ultimately, Congress accepted this third model, selective yearly allocations, but imposed more extensive procedural requirements. Under the
Act, allocations may be established or changed only by formal Presidential
Determination following congressional consultation, as elaborately
defined in the Act. 67 Congress also altered the phrase governing allocations to read: "refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United

States." 68
There have been efforts to read great significance into the addition by
Congress of the adjective "humanitarian." But the word change offers little
assistance in deriving standards for judging whether any given allocation
decision is proper under the Act. Any refugee resettlement program is
animated, at least in part, by a humanitarian spirit. But Congress plainly
intended to authorize selectivity, and selectivity is in many ways antithetical to a truly humanitarian response. The House committee report explains
that the change was meant to emphasize that the "plight of the refugees
themselves.., should be paramount." But paramount is not exclusive, and
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the report itself supplies a lengthy list of other factors appropriately considered in the allocation process (such as family, cultural or historical ties,
or past U.S. involvement in, or treaty relations with, the country of origin). 69 Nor does the Act mandate choices divorced from foreign policy
considerations. Section 207(e) specifically directs the Administration to
report to Congress the expected impact of refugee programs on the "foreign policy interests of the United States."
It was often suggested that the legislation should list the precise factors
to govern allocations, perhaps by providing a statutory definition of "special concern" or "special humanitarian concern." 70 Congress ultimately
rejected that approach, convinced by over twenty years of experience with
refugee paroles that the conditions generating admission decisions could
not be comprehensively catalogued. Any such specification was susceptible to early obsolescence. Witness the fate of conditional entry itself, a
provision which was conceived in its day as a precise statement of the
refugees who were of concern to the United States. 71 Both Judiciary Committee reports on the Refugee Act, noting the need to maintain flexibility,
state that the phrase cannot be defined. 72 "Special humanitarian concern"
is therefore best understood as a term of art indicating that a difficult
political choice will be made each year by the political branches of the
government based on shifting assessments of political and humanitarian
factors, again within the procedural discipline imposed by the Act.
The Refugee Act thus rejects "discrimination" of the type embodied in
the discredited conditional entry model-frozen statutory limits on the
groups of refugees to whom the United States would ever offer resettlement. But it plainly endorses continued selectivity in the distribution of
admission offers, selectivity adjustable over time. Complete denial of resettlement to certain groups, especially if other solutions to that particular
refugee problem are available, could be entirely consistent with the Act.
The point of the Act was not to make it possible for every refugee to
compete for an opportunity to resettle in the United States. Its purpose was
to create a sound structure for deciding how best to targetfinite U.S. admission slots to alleviate refugee suffering worldwide.
Of course, what appears to the decision maker as careful selection may
appear to the advocate of an excluded group as raw discrimination. Therein
lies the source of the continuing political battles that are inevitable under
the Act. The price of the flexibility deemed essential is acceptance of that
continued political controversy. As a result, it is too strong to claim, as the
committee reports and many advocates have done, that the Act finally
establishes a "comprehensive" refugee policy for the United States. 73 It
does not, for it does not set numerical limits nor identify the groups or
people who will be offered resettlement. Instead, it establishes a procedural
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framework for yearly decisions, by the president in consultation with the
Congress, as to what the policy will be.
In Wat Detail? The allocation structure created by the Act works as
follows. The documents sent to Congress in advance of consultations set
forth the president's proposed allocation of refugee numbers. Congress,
acting through senior members of the Judiciary Committees who meet in
person with the president's representatives, conveys its views on allocation, as well as on total admission levels. Following consultations, the
formal Presidential Determination then specifies not only the number of
refugee admissions for the coming fiscal year, but also the allocation of
numbers among the selected refugee groups. Any change in the stated
allocation will require a new consultation, including a new submission of
the extensive documentation mandated by section 207(e).
Neither the statute nor the legislative history dictates the level of detail
required in the specification of refugee groups who are to receive allocations. To date, those allocations have been remarkably general, broken
down essentially by continent. The latest Presidential Determination allocates 168,000 admissions to Indochinese refugees, 33,000 to Soviet refugees, and then far smaller amounts to other groups identified only as
follows: "Eastern Europe, Near East, Latin America, Africa." 74 At various
points the more detailed consultation document suggests priorities to be
applied within each such category. For example, with respect to nonCuban Latin American refugees, first priority goes to political prisoners
and their families, second to refugees under the protection of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and third to family reunification
cases. Nothing states, however, that others in Latin America meeting the
refugee definition are not of "special humanitarian concern;" ostensibly,
they simply assume a place farther back in line. Moreover, these suggested
priorities are not binding in the same manner as the breakdown incorporated in the Presidential Determination. These priorities can be altered by
action of the executive branch alone, since the requirement in section 207
for formal advance consultation with Congress governs only amendment
of the allocations shown in the Determination.
The current, broadly general approach to allocation certainly maximizes
the executive branch's flexibility to respond to changing needs within the
designated regions. Moreover, by setting up a system where virtually no
refugee is formally excluded from "special humanitarian concern," the
executive branch has been able to finesse the political complaints almost
certain to be heard from the partisans of any excluded groups. It has clearly
said "yes" in a major way to U.S. resettlement of certain groups, but it has
not mustered the fortitude to say an unequivocal "no" to others. This
luxury, however, is unlikely to last, for several reasons.
First, Congress has in the past gone to great lengths in reviewing precise
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breakdowns of parole authorizations-demanding, for example, resettlement from Southeast Asia of a higher percentage of Khmer refugees as
compared to Vietnamese. 7 The legislative history of the Act suggests that
Congress subjected allocations to the Act's formal consultation requirements (rejecting the information-only approach of the Administration's
proposed bill) precisely because it expected to retain a major voice in the
detailed decision. 76 If Congress begins to perceive the current generality
of Presidential Determinations as a threat to its role, it may well insist on
more precise specification as a means of restoring its authority.
Second, serious administrative problems are cropping up in the implementation of the current allocations. For example, although only 4,500
refugee admission numbers have been allocated to that area known as the
Near East, any person in the area who meets the refugee definition
theoretically qualifies for one of those 4,500 numbers, subject only to
waiting in line. United States consular officers in Pakistan, therefore, have
been swamped with applications from the Afghan refugees in that country. 77 Although the consultation document states a vague preference for
persons with family ties or other relations to the United States, nothing in
that priority system gives the officer a basis for refusing to consider any
particular application, even if the refugee alleges no U.S. ties and therefore
has no realistic chance of claiming one of the 4,500 spaces. The officer's
only apparent task is to determine whether the individual indeed meets the
UN refugee definition and then to place the file in the appropriate priority
category. An intolerable backlog is likely, which observers may blame on
the Act rather than on the strikingly broad allocation categories chosen to
implement it. The Refugee Act, in any event, affords a straightforward
remedy: more detailed allocations employing criteria that permit early
rejection of defined classes of applications.
The third reason for more precise delineation of allocation categories
may be the most important. The current practice may complicate the
process of working out local solutions to refugee problems. International
diplomacy has sometimes succeeded in securing arrangements for voluntary repatriation. For example, over 120,000 Zairians repatriated from Angola to Zaire and nearly 200,000 Arakanese Moslems returned from
Bangladesh to Burma in 1978 and 1979.78 In neither case was U.S. resettlement even a remote prospect. Today that possibility is dangled before all
the refugees in those areas. The surge of applications by Afghans certainly
suggests that such U.S. bait-however illusory because of limited admission slots-may well change the political equation and make voluntary
repatriation harder to arrange, or perhaps stiffen the resistance of firstasylum countries to long-term resettlement in place. Narrower allocations,
including, where appropriate, flat denials of admission allocations to some
groups, may be necessary to avoid such a result. Resettlement of refugees

REFUGEE ENTRY: UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVES

109

to distant lands is rarely a good solution, and it is widely viewed only as
a last resort. The United States has no stake in eroding that perception by
profligate, but illusory, offers of U.S. resettlement to the refugee populations of entire continents.
Asylum
The Accomplishments
The Carter Administration's proposed legislation would have made only
technical changes in the provisions of the INA relating to asylum. Formerly, the one section directly applicable afforded the attorney general discre79
tion to withhold deportation if the alien would be subject to persecution.
The Administration proposal extended that discretion to apply in exclusion as well as deportation cases, and altered the phrasing, but not the
substance, of the standard the claimant must meet. 80 Regulations promulgated under the attorney general's general authority over immigration,
however, had made asylum available in exclusion cases for several years,
so the change was of minor significance. 81
In a March 1979 letter to the secretary of state commenting on the draft
bill, the U.S. Office of the UNHCR expressed support for most of the
refugee provisions, but discreetly suggested that more should be done with
regard to asylum. Noting that the United States is a party to the Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees (and hence derivatively bound by the
operative provisions of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees), 82 the UNHCR urged that these commitments be reflected in mandatory, rather than discretionary, provisions of U.S. law. Some private
refugee and human rights organizations picked up on the theme. 83 Both
houses of Congress were receptive, and with Administration cooperation,
more detailed provisions were drafted and included in the final version.
The statute now expressly forbids returning an individual, in any form
of proceeding, to any country where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion-virtually verbatim the nonrefoulement obligation of Article 33 of the Convention. Exceptions, designed to
track the sometimes vague language of the exceptions to the Convention,
remove from the protection of the statute spies, dangerous criminals, persons who have themselves engaged in persecution, and certain others. 84
The Refugee Act made one other major beneficial change respecting
asylum. Under the old practice, no immigration status was clearly available
for successful asylum applicants, and the word "asylum" appeared nowhere in the INA. Depending on when the applicant was apprehended by
INS or at what stage of the proceedings the asylum claim proved successful, the applicant might have been granted parole, extended voluntary

110

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES

departure, or stay of deportation. 85 Since these administrative categories
were designed for other uses, the documentation received by the successful
asylum applicant often did more to obscure than to reveal his or her
entitlement to remain in the United States indefinitely.
The Refugee Act remedied this situation by adding a new section 208
to the INA. s6 It not only mentions asylum explicitly but in essence creates
a new, unique immigration status. A person granted this "asylum" status
should qualify for federal assistance of the same type available to those
who enter as "refugees." Obtaining asylum status also begins a process
that can lead eventually to lawful permanent resident status. The provisions governing adjustment of status, however, differ significantly from
those that apply to refugees. An asylee, for example, must show that he
or she still meets the refugee definition at the time of adjustment; he or
she is ineligible if there has been a change of conditions in the home
country dissipating the threat of persecution. On the other hand, adjustment of status is nearly automatic for persons in refugee status after
physical presence in the United States for one year, regardless of developments in the home country. No numerical ceiling limits grants of permanent residence to refugees once they have been admitted, but only 5,000
asylees may adjust in any given year, and the attorney general has discretion to lower that number or to halt adjustments altogether. 87
A Minor Improvement
Title IV of the Refugee Act also nibbled at the edges of what remains a
troublesome aspect of U.S. asylum processing-namely, provision for care
and assistance for individuals while their asylum claims are under review.
Suppose INS finds a person landing on a Florida beach, without visa or
passport, after journeying from his home in a Carribean nation. He asks
immediately for asylum. What is his status? He cannot lay claim to the U.S.
immigration status labeled "refugee," for he was not selected in accordance
with section 207 of the INA. He would like to win "asylum" status under
section 208, but that can come only after he has proved that his alleged
fear of persecution is well-founded, a process that may take months or
even years. In the meantime, the mere lodging of an asylum application
does not erase the ostensible illegality of his presence here. He is an illegal
alien.
As a result, he is subject to incarceration while U.S. officials consider his
claim, but unless he seems to pose some danger, INS more likely will grant
a form of short-term parole that allows him to be at large in the community
pending further processing. Under INS's 1980 asylum regulations, he probably will receive authorization to work, absent a most unlikely finding by
the INS district director that his asylum claim is frivolous. 88 This type of
temporary parole, however, still leaves him subject to statutory provisions
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passed to prevent illegal aliens from claiming various types of public
assistance. 89 Until his asylum application is adjudicated favorably, he
remains for these purposes an illegal entrant.
Those restrictive statutory provisions were not enacted with asylum
applicants in mind, but the drafters of Title IV of the Refugee Act worried
that any change to allow full-scale assistance to all applicants might simply
induce floods of dubious asylum applications. Plainly that worry would
abate if final rulings rejecting meritless asylum claims could be expected
promptly. But the drafters knew that under existing law tenacious litigants
could block final orders of deportation for years, and they saw nothing to
guarantee against similar delays in the future. Title IV therefore takes only
a small step. It authorizes federal reimbursement to state and local public
agencies for expenditures made in providing certain social services to a
limited, finite group of asylum applicants, those who had applied for
asylum before November 1, 1979, and who were not subject to a final
deportation or exclusion order at the time of the expenditure. In practice,
this measure principally relieved Florida, which had carried the burden of
assistance to several thousand Haitians.
Obviously this limited step is only a stopgap. New applicants for asylum will continue to arrive, and a certain percentage doubtless will require
assistance from some source while awaiting adjudication. Their presence
clearly constitutes a federal responsibility, for states neither patrol the
coastal waters nor adjudicate asylum claims. Significant further movement
toward full assistance to applicants is unlikely, however, until the United
States has in place a system that assures prompt finality in asylum adjudications. Such a system would reduce the assistance problem to a manageable scale, for assistance would then be extended, in most cases, for only
a few months until final adjudication. If the application for asylum were
granted, the applicant would graduate to eligibility for all programs available to asylees. If not granted, prompt expulsion would ensue. Any incentive to file a questionable application in order to claim benefits would
disappear. Solving the assistance problem thus hinges on solving the adjudication problem, a matter treated below.
Relation to Refugee Determinations
in Overseas Programs
Two other lingering problems overshadow the accomplishments sketched
above. First, the Refugee Act expressly links the grant of asylum to the
applicant's satisfying Part A of the statute's refugee definition. 90 There is
nothing surprising in this linkage, since Part A essentially restates the
Convention definition, which by treaty already governed asylum determinations. 91 A probelm arises, however, because this is exactly the definition
that sets the threshold qualifications for the U.S. overseas refugee pro-
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grams. 92 Critics have charged vociferously that the defacto standard applied
93
overseas is far more relaxed than that applied to asylum applicants.
Vietnamese boat people, they claim, benefit from a presumption that all
who risked their lives at sea faced persecution at home and therefore meet
the refugee definition. Yet Haitians, who also crossed the seas in flimsy
boats but happened to land directly in the United States, enjoy no similar
presumption. To claim asylum, they must show more than the simple fact
of flight or the existence of human rights abuses in Haiti. They must
provide evidence that they themselves are likely to be singled out for
persecution on return, and their stories will be minutely scrutinized.
These critics are right. There is, de facto, a difference in the application
of the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard. 94 Administration pronouncements often try to dodge the issue by pointing to the formal (but
routine) INS finding that the UN refugee definition is met by each beneficiary of overseas programs. As the provisions are actually administered,
however, the UN definition poses a significantly higher hurdle for asylum
applicants. Overseas refugee staffs devote very little attention to the question of likely persecution; 95 INS and State Department officials involved
in passing on asylum claims examine that issue in great detail. 96
The interesting question, however, is what conclusions to draw from
this revelation of a dual standard. In quest of consistency, one might relax
the scrutiny of asylum claims, thereby reducing the showing of likely
persecution required of an applicant. A demonstration that the home government often abuses human rights, for example, might be sufficient without any demonstration that the individual is a likely target. But the
practical consequences of such a change in asylum scrutiny could easily be
enormous.
Asylum constitutes a wild card in the immigration deck. No other
provision of the INA opens such a broad potential prospect of U.S. residency to aliens without the inconvenience of prescreening or selection. An
alien may enter in flagrant disregard of U.S. immigration laws, but if he
meets the asylum test, he is entitled to stay in the United States indefinitely
and to advance toward permanent residence here. By the very nature of
the UN Protocol commitment, the United States is not entitled to apply
other criteria in deciding whether to extend this protection-criteria such
as family ties, other U.S. connections, or employment skills, routinely
applied to other intending immigrants. If the alien proves a well-founded
fear of persecution, then, by law, he or she cannot be returned to the home
country.
This system need not be alarming, if wisely administered. Asylum
became an immigration law loophole for good reasons. Returning people
to situations where they are almost sure to face persecution, no matter how
they reached U.S. shores, would flatly contradict American tradition. 97 But
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if it becomes too easy to establish entitlement to asylum, if the United
States does not stringently require the applicant to show solid reasons why
he or she is likely to be singled out for persecution on return, then great
numbers of illegal aliens would probably be happy to surface and claim
the benefits of asylum. The United States is also accessible to thousands
more in the Caribbean, Central America, and, conceivably, in South
America, who would leave countries with poor enough human rights
records to make any claim to asylum at least initially plausible.
Because the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard is the only
criterion the Protocol permits parties to apply (assuming that the applicant
is neither a spy nor a criminal), there are strong incentives to administer
that standard with scrupulous care and to insist on more than a showing
of general abuses by the home government. The UNHCR handbook on
determination of refugee status generally indicates such a circumscribed
and individualized standard, 98 and American judicial decisions support
that approach. 99 A relaxation of asylum scrutiny is thus unlikely.
The second option for bringing consistency to U.S. application of the
UN refugee definition is to tighten scrutiny overseas. In fact, large populations in temporary asylum areas probably do contain many who could not
prove entitlement if subjected to asylum-type scrutiny. Particularly as it
becomes known that the United States and other attractive countries are
resettling large numbers from the first-asylum camps, migrants are surely
drawn there for reasons other than fear of persecution. ' 00
Any tightening in overseas scrutiny, however, would require a much
greater commitment of staff and resources. As asylum processing demonstrates, establishing with reasonable confidence that an applicant fears
persecution and that the fear is well-founded requires careful interviewing, steps to verify the events claimed as the basis of the fear, and ultimately a difficult assessment of the applicant's credibility. American field staff
is already stretched thin in applying the other, more accessible, screening
criteria currently employed. '01 Devoting additional resources to a more
finely-tuned application of the refugee definition is not worthwhile, for a
simple reason. Finding a Vietnamese national in Malaysia or an Eastern
European in Frankfurt to be a refugee within the UN definition furnishes
only the first step in a process that may or may not lead to resettlement
in the United States. Physical distance virtually assures that that person
will not come to the United States unless selected for the resettlement
program, and the Refugee Act's allocation provisions clearly authorize the
use of other screening criteria. The practical imperative for stringent application of the refugee definition is therefore minor. Screening can be
done, and in its most important respects will continue to be done, on the
basis of other criteria.
The availability of other screening criteria overseas, coupled with the
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inevitable difficulty and expense entailed in scrupulous application of the
refugee definition in any context, amply justifies the de facto difference in
application of the "refugee" definition. And justified or not, the divergence
is quite likely to continue.
As long as the statute, however, formally applies the same definitional
test to asylum and refugee determinations, this inconsistency will remain
a powerful fulcrum for complaints about denials of asylum. The only
adequate remedy for the problem would be an amendment to the Act to
separate the two standards, recognizing forthrightly the different imperatives that govern review of the respective applicants' compliance with the
refugee definition. 102
Adequacy of Current Procedures
A second fundamental problem with current U.S. asylum policy is, in the
long run, more important. What procedures should this country use to
make the difficult determination whether an applicant qualifies for asylum? On this critical question the UN Convention and Protocol give remarkably little guidance.
The procedures for making that determination are now established by
regulation, and the regulations have changed several times over recent
years. 103 The current procedure calls for a milange of decisions-either
binding or advisory-by INS district directors, immigration judges, and the
State Department. 104 In section 208 of the INA, added by the Refugee Act,
Congress provided a new statutory basis for these procedures and, via
directives contained in a committee report, called for minor changes that
would reinstate a larger role for the district directors. 105 At no time during
consideration of the Refugee Act, however, did the executive or the legislative branch take a measured look at the overall system for decision making
in asylum cases. And in fairness, the system's ailments were not fully
apparent until after the Act's passage, when drastically increased arrivals
of Cubans and Haitians coincided with major court decisions, rendered in
long-pending litigation involving Haitians, that presaged lengthy new
delays. 106
A comprehensive reexamination is needed because the current system
has largely broken down. Litigation can too easily delay asylum cases and
interrupt processing at too many different stages. 107 Final orders are hard
to achieve. Moreover, even when final decisions are reached, the current
system is not widely enough regarded as reliable to ensure that the political
leaders will be willing to deport unsuccessful claimants. This hesitation
reflects a deep-seated national ambivalence about the proper treatment of
illegal entrants who come from countries such as Haiti and Cuba, where
life is demonstrably unfree, but who have not proven that they are likely
to be targeted for persecution if returned. Much of the disorder in the U.S.
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response to the 1980 Cuban influx may be traced to that ambivalence-a
feeling that the recently concluded deliberations on the Refugee Act had
done little to dispel, in view of the scant attention devoted to asylum
questions. 108
This is not the occasion to canvass alternative procedures for adjudicating asylum claims. ' 09 Mention should be made, however, of the imposing
difficulties a nation faces in fashioning a process that works expeditiously
but fairly, for the asylum determination rests on uniquely elusive grounds.
It will usually turn on facts which are strikingly inaccessible by comparison with other matters routinely adjudicated by U.S. courts and agencies.
Applicants typically base their claims on events in a distant land, about
which the U.S. Government may otherwise have no information-matters
such as their own past political activities, or abuses visited on them or their
families and friends. Bona fide applicants are unlikely to have left their
homelands with corroborating documentation in hand or with supporting
witnesses. 110 On the other hand, fraudulent applicants can probably count
on the government's inability to produce evidence disproving their stories. 11 Asylum determinations therefore often revolve criticially around
a determination of the applicant's credibility. Moreover, even if past
events can be established with some certainty, the crucial determination
does not stem directly from these factual findings of the classical sort.
Instead, one must venture into the realm of prediction to decide whether
a claimed fear of future persectuion is well-founded. Reasonable people
can disagree in good faith about whether a given showing of the prevalence
of persecution in the home country makes a particular applicant's fear
well-founded. Applications present a continuum, running from clearly
legitimate claims, through borderline cases from countries where all residents are exposed to some risk of persecution, to fanciful fears and bogus
applications. The process, however, demands a flat yes or no answer in
each case. Because of the large gray area, political considerations-the U.S.
Government's hostility or friendship for the allegedly persecuting regime
-might easily affect the results. And even where the government is committed to avoiding that practice, it will be hard-pressed to prove that
political considerations did not intrude.
Whatever the decision-making structure ultimately chosen, the time to
undertake a thorough review of alternate systems and to begin building a
consensus about asylum policy is now. The backlog of unresolved asylum
applications is expanding, owing both to a surge in new applications and
to litigation that prevents final disposition of old ones. 112 The backlog
tempts more people to come to the United States, as they learn that even
if apprehended, illegal entrants who apply for asylum seemingly never
suffer deportation. American citizens perceive the same phenomenon and
find it less than pleasing. The government's inability to reach final, en-
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forceable decisions on asylum applications fuels a spreading sense that
immigration policy is out of control. 113 Ultimately that perception threatens a backlash against the entire asylum commitment, if people give up in
frustration on mending the asylum loophole and turn instead to solutions
that close the loophole altogether. 114 And any such reaction threatens to
bring with it sharp reductions in other U.S. resettlement programs as well.
For this reason, not only those who oppose all immigration or who are
anti-Haitian or anti-Cuban or hostile to any other group of potential
asylum applicants have an interest in repairing the asylum loophole to
restore its originally intended size. Those who favor continuing a generous
program of refugee immigration may well have the greatest stake in crafting decision-making procedures that work and are perceived to work,
procedures that say yes or no to asylum applicants promptly and then
make that decision stick. 115 The taming of the asylum process remains the
major unfinished business left by the Refugee Act of 1980.
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